The publication was prepared by the scientific department of the State Unitary Enterprise IVMK “Bendery Fortress”, in August 2020, for the 250th anniversary of the assault on the fortress by the Russian army of P. Panin
The campaign of Russian troops on the Dniester, the siege and capture of the Ottoman fortress of Bendery by them in 1770
In the second half of the XVIII century. The Bendery fortress was a stronghold of Turkish domination in the Prut-Dniester region. On the eve and at the beginning of the Russian-Turkish war, which began in 1769, the residence of a seraskir was located in Bendery, who commanded all Turkish troops and garrisons of fortresses in the Ochakov eyyalet, on the entire northwestern coast of the Black Sea.
The results of the 1769 campaign caused serious discontent in St. Petersburg. The commander of the 1st Russian army, Prince A.M. Golitsyn, surrounded by Empress Catherine II, was accused of not being able to take advantage of the results of his victories over the Turkish troops and develop a strategic success. Indeed, the remnants of the Turkish troops, defeated by the Russians under the leadership of General P.A. Rumyantsev at the Ryaba Mogila, managed to retreat behind the Danube, where they restored their combat capability. In the Principality of Moldavia, the uprising of the population, which unfolded with the entry of the Russians, was suppressed. The Khotyn fortress, taken by parts under the command of Golitsyn, was abandoned, and the Russian troops were withdrawn beyond the Dniester. Large Turkish detachments remained in the fortresses of Bendery, Ochakov, Kiliya and Izmail. The Crimean cavalry was assembled at the headquarters of the Khan of the Budzhak Tatars in Kaushany, southwest of Bendery, and was preparing for war with the Russians. Prince A.M. Golitsyn was removed, the Empress assigned the command of the 1st Army to General P.A. Rumyantsev.
In addition to the victory at the Pockmarked Grave, Petr Alexandrovich was known as the organizer of the rebuff in 1769 to the raid of the Crimean Tatar cavalry on the southern borders of Novorossia. Then the actions of the troops under the command of Rumyantsev made it possible to pin down large Ottoman forces in Bessarabia and thereby disrupt the plans of the Turkish command.
In addition to the victory at the Pockmarked Grave, Petr Alexandrovich was known as the organizer of the rebuff in 1769 to the raid of the Crimean Tatar cavalry on the southern borders of Novorossia. Then the actions of the troops under the command of Rumyantsev made it possible to pin down large Ottoman forces in Bessarabia and thereby disrupt the plans of the Turkish command.
The appointment of Count Pyotr Ivanovich Panin as commander of the 2nd Russian Army could be explained by contemporaries by the fact that he was the brother of the de facto head of the Russian government, Nikita Ivanovich Panin. Despite the high rank of General-in-Chief, there were no military victories for the count. Nevertheless, when developing the plan for the campaign of 1770, the Military Council under the Empress set very responsible tasks for the 2nd Russian Army. According to the campaign plan, the following tasks were set for the 2nd Army: the capture of the Turkish fortresses of Bendery, Akkerman. Ochakov, Kiliya and Ishmael; it was also entrusted with the protection of the entire southern border of Russia from Tatar raids. The command of the Russian army considered the capture of the Turkish fortresses of Bendery and Ochakov as a prelude to forcing the Danube and the exit of Russian troops to the Balkan Peninsula.
In the plans of the Military Council under the Empress, the capture of the Bendery fortress was presented as a task that Russian troops could solve with the help of one strong assault. “Bendery,” Catherine II noted in a rescript addressed to Count P.I. Panin, - they can hardly hold out for a long time. In a letter dated October 14 to his brother Nikita Ivanovich, Pyotr Panin regarded the task assigned to him as extremely difficult: “In order for the heavy guns assigned to the siege artillery to be transported there in the current weather and on philistine local horses, I don’t find it at all possible for me. For how many sieges with a sufficient institution are useful and glorious, in contrast to this, they are unprofitable and unsuccessful, and our army will be especially inglorious if they also show the world a new failure in them.
However, the order had to be followed. When developing the plan for the campaign of the 2nd Army, its commander tried to take into account the lessons of the campaigns of Russian troops in the Black Sea region during the previous Russian-Turkish war. The experience of the actions of the army of General Kh.A. Minicha in 1738 against the Turkish fortresses showed the need for careful preparation and provision of troops with everything necessary. In view of the complexity of the tasks assigned to the troops, Panin proposed to increase the size of the 2nd Russian army - including services that ensure the actions of the troops - up to 100 thousand people, and divide it into three separate corps. The combat strength of the 2nd Army was to be increased to 60,000 soldiers and officers.
During the two winter months of 1770, the 2nd Army was actively preparing for a difficult campaign through the steppe regions from the Southern Bug to the Dniester. To provide the army with food, food stores were established along the Bug River and in Novorossia. Large mobile stores were formed in Elisavetgrad and Bakhmut. A convoy with a two-month supply of food was organized for each regiment. An adequate number of horses and oxen were purchased to ensure the delivery of supplies to the troops. For the construction of pontoon bridges and crossings P.I. Panin ordered that a sufficient amount of timber be prepared in advance.
According to Panin's plan, the 1st and 2nd corps were to operate on the right bank of the Dnieper. After forcing the Bug, the 1st Corps, according to the original plan, numbering 25 thousand bayonets and cavalry, was supposed to prevent the actions of the Ottomans against the borders of Russia and the rear of the main forces of the 2nd Army from the Ochakovsky direction. The 2nd Corps, numbering 35 thousand fighters, was ordered to capture the enemy's fortresses on the Dniester - subject to the successful actions of Rumyantsev's army against the main forces of the Ottoman Porte. Otherwise, the corps must link up with the 1st Army in order to defeat the main enemy forces. After that, the corps could begin to capture the Turkish fortresses. A separate corps under the command of Lieutenant General M.V. Berg, designed to cover the southern borders of Russia and carry out sabotage in the Crimean direction, holding down the actions of the Tatar troops, consisted of 21 thousand soldiers and officers and was deployed on the left bank of the Dnieper.
By the beginning of the campaign in 1770, the 2nd Russian Army, despite all expectations, had half as many troops as planned by the General Staff and by Panin himself. Regular, i.e. the most trained troops were about 33 thousand, which included infantry regiments, engineering, artillery and pontoon teams. Irregular troops, consisting of pikemen, hussars, Little Russian regiments, as well as regiments of the Cossack Don army, were about 22 thousand. Already when approaching the crossing point on the Dniester in the Dubossary region, 5,000 mounted Kalmyks joined the army. As mentioned above, Panin was forced to allocate troops to Berg's corps, troops were also allocated to a special Prozorovsky corps, designed to operate on the left bank of the Dniester and cover the army from the Tatars and Turks from Ochakov and Gadzhibey. In addition, when the army moved to Dubossary, Panin had to leave guards for stores (warehouses) created during the movement, small earthen fortifications designed to ensure the safe supply of necessary supplies for the army. Those. the commander allocated large forces to ensure the security of communications of his troops. There were also 197 guns.
To force water barriers, 100 pontoons were made. Due to the insufficient number of personnel, P.I. Panin adjusted the original plan of the campaign, redistributing troops to solve priority tasks. Petersburg tried to resolve the conflict with the Crimean Khanate amicably. On behalf of Catherine II, Panin tried to start negotiations with the Tatar khans and murzas in order to "make a test, whether it will be possible to shake the Crimea and all the Tatar peoples in loyalty to the Port." To help Panin from the Collegium of Foreign Affairs, the secretary of the collegium Ravich and the adviser to the office Veselitsky were sent. In accordance with the instructions received from St. Petersburg, the count sent letters to the Crimean Khan and to many Murzas and to ordinary Tatars of the steppe hordes. In them Panin wrote, “that Her Majesty’s sincere desire is to bring a prosperous existence to the Crimea and all the Tatar hordes belonging to it for eternity, independent of any power, in which Russia vouches for its patronage”. If the Tatars were ready to give up vassalage to the Ottoman Porte, the commander of the 2nd Army prescribed, they should send delegates for negotiations. Otherwise, Panin - remembering the actions of the Tatars during the raids on Russian lands - threatened to destroy their camps and settlements.
Even before the start of the campaign, in 1769, having insufficient information about the fortress and the terrain into which the army was supposed to enter, a corps under the command of Christian Wittgenstein was sent to Bendery, consisting of 4 battalions and one regiment of dragoons, to which a detachment of General Zorich was also attached . The main task of this corps was reconnaissance and collection of information about the fortress, its garrison, fortifications, as well as the intensity of the Turkish-Tatar troops at the crossing point on the Dniester River and in the area when approaching the fortress. Moreover, having insufficient information about the enemy, Wittgenstein was assigned a completely adventurous task, if possible, by the forces of the corps, and completely take Bendery, if there is such an opportunity. As a result of this raid, when approaching Bendery, the corps got bogged down in skirmishes with the Turkish-Tatar cavalry, but by interviewing local residents and captured prisoners, he managed to collect information that the fortress was well fortified, its garrison exceeded 10 thousand combat-ready troops with four hundred guns. The fact that special hopes were placed on Wittgenstein's corps, says the phrase in a letter to Panin's brother, where he wrote “As a puerperal of my childbirth, I expect a report from him.” Thanks to the information collected, Panin realized that Bendery could not be taken without a proper siege and that there could be no talk of any swift, unprepared assault on the fortress.
Army P.I. Panina set out on a campaign on March 20, 1770. Due to the strong spring thaw, her progress was slow. The floods of the rivers made it necessary to build bridges on piles, even in places where there used to be small streams. On June 28, the forward detachments of the army approached the Dniester north of Dubossary. “I was the first of the Russian generals to receive happiness in the month of June, not only not with a ruined, but with how small, so best, an army that was not weakened in any way, to cross the river. Dniester"- he wrote to his brother Nikita Ivanovich. To completely encircle and block the fortress, the commander of the 2nd Army divided it into two detachments. On July 2, a detachment of General M.F. Kamensky, without crossing to the right bank of the river. The Dniester, along the left bank, advanced to the village of Parkany, located directly opposite the fortress, to block it and deliver artillery strikes from the east.
For the crossing of the main forces of the army and siege artillery north of Dubossary, in the area of the villages of Rogi and Doibany, on July 6, a floating bridge on galleys was built across the Dniester. In order to stop the advance of the Russian troops, the garrison of the Bendery fortress undertook a number of sorties. On July 7, the Turks, numbering up to a thousand fighters, attacked the Cossack unit from the detachment of M.F. Kamensky. Having met a rebuff from the Cossacks, the Turkish detachment hastily retreated. However, on July 10, the Turks attacked the positions of the main forces of the army of Count P.I. Panina on the Byk River.
On July 15, the main forces of the 2nd Army approached Bendery. A complete surprise for the Russians was the fact that a whole line of Turkish fortifications was revealed far beyond the fortress itself, which surrounded the fortress in a semicircle and, before breaking through to its walls, they had to initially break through this well-fortified line (retrashement). Already during the siege and the information collected, it became known that Panin was opposed by forces that were not inferior to him in number - 30 thousand Turks against his 33 thousand.
When approaching Bendery, General-in-Chief Panin broke his army into five columns and proceeded to completely encircle and block the fortress at a distance from the Turkish retrashment line. Three columns are located north of the fortress. Two columns, having made a detour, surrounded it from the south. On the left bank of the Dniester, the crossing was occupied by a detachment of General M.F. Kamensky. In order to prevent a complete blockade of the fortress on July 15, the Turks attacked the right flank of the 2nd Russian army. Seeing the retreat of his avant-garde, P.I. Panin sent reinforcements and attacked the Turks from three sides. The enemy could not withstand the swift counterattack and retreated into the fortress. Pursuing the retreating Turkish detachment, the Russian troops approached the outer moat of the fortress and tried to break into the city. However, Panin stopped the troops, explaining his actions by "fear of infection." Having become acquainted in more detail with the state of affairs in the fortress and the garrison, Peter Ivanovich abandoned the idea of an immediate assault, and proceeded to the siege.
The Russian troops, under the cover of artillery, were supposed to gradually bring their positions as close as possible to the fortress. The mine work plan was developed by engineer-general Rodion Nikolaevich Gerbel, who was sent to the 2nd Army with the task of doing siege work. He fortified the camp near Bendery and developed a plan for the siege of the fortress. In fact, it was an engineering plan to capture an enemy fortification.
Later, this operation, which became the only such case in the history of Russian siege art, was called the "underground war". All siege work was carried out under his direct supervision clearly and smoothly and led to the expected result. Caution P.I. Panin was not without reason. On August 4, he reminded his brother that he did not have superior forces: "... room conclusions about our appeals against the enemy are completely ... unrighteous and false ... Could there already be ... what kind of savings ... where the enemy is in the fortress, being almost even, with his infantry, besieging ...". At night, Russian troops dug trenches, and during the day they fired at the fortress. The first massive artillery shelling was carried out on July 21 and then was carried out almost daily with the participation of batteries from the left bank, which fired primarily at the approaches from the Water Gate to the Dniester. This immediately affected the city's water supply. Defectors from the fortress said that in Bendery the price of water had risen sharply.
In order to undermine the morale of the garrison, P.I. Panin sent 9 captured Turks with the news of the victory of P.A. Rumyantsev near the Larga River on July 7, 1770 and with a proposal to surrender. Seraskir (military commander) Mohammed Urzhi Valasi rejected this proposal. However, a few days later, the seraskir died suddenly. At the general council, the Turkish military leaders with a request to take command of the garrison turned to the three-bunch Pasha Mehmet-Emin, who was in the fortress.
The sorties of the Turkish garrison continued. First of all, the Turks sought to prevent earthworks and the construction of trenches and batteries. Describing the constant skirmishes with the garrison, Panin wrote in a letter to his brother: “For six days in a row ... has been making the most desperate sorties and forcing me ... to rush around my entire position, which must be very extensively held, but only by ten infantry regiments; your brother, being the chief commander, almost every night ... rarely more to fight against the enemy ... brings out, like up to a thousand infantry."
On August 1, Panin's army suffered an irreparable and heavy loss. Closer to midnight, a large detachment of Turks attacked the positions of the Russians and even managed to break through them, hand-to-hand and bayonet fighting began in the trenches. At this time, the trench work was led by Major General Wilhelm Lebel with Colonels Kochius and Pavlov, who were the first to organize the defense of positions, were able to push back the Turks and drive them to the fortress wall. But, as eyewitnesses wrote, General Lebel showed imprudence and was wounded by an enemy bullet because of the glacis and died soon after two hours. That night, Russian losses were significant - several senior officers were killed, as well as almost 200 privates, 473 were wounded.
On the night of August 2-3, a Turkish detachment silently left the fortress again and attacked the trenches of the Russian troops. Fortress artillery with strong fire from the bastions supported the sortie of the Turkish detachment. Reconnaissance in force convinced the Turks that the Russian troops were carrying out active mine work to undermine their defenses. From that moment on, the sorties of the garrison took on a purposeful character: to stop the earthworks of the Russians. After daytime skirmishes and mutual skirmishes at night, work was in full swing on both sides to restore the destroyed and build new underground galleries. Upon learning that they also began to dig a “counter mine” from the fortress, P.I. Panin ordered to deepen the ditch in front of the most important forward positions of his troops.
The siege dragged on, and the 2nd Army began to experience difficulties in supplying troops. In early August, an acute shortage of artillery supplies began to be felt. Artillerymen fired no more than 100 shots per day at the fortress. Pyotr Ivanovich ordered that the soldiers collect the cores at night. In the middle of the month, there were heavy rains for several days, which damaged part of the mine galleries of the Russian army. Pyotr Ivanovich was forced to keep large forces to cover his troops from the rear and turned for help to the commander of the 1st Army, General-in-Chief P.A. Rumyantsev. Rumyantsev refused, because he involved all his troops in the battle of the river. Larga with the main forces of the Turkish troops. After the defeat of the Turkish army, the Turkish army near the river. Cahul Panin was still afraid of the Ottoman strike from Ackerman and Kiliya and again asked Rumyantsev for help in order to take Bendery as soon as possible. Despite the victories in the battles of Larga and Cahul, P.A. Rumyantsev considered the forces available to him insufficient for the successful continuation of the war.
The replenishment requested by Rumyantsev from Catherine II has not yet arrived from Russia, and he pointed out to Panin in his letter that it was impossible to send the corps of Prince N.V. Repnin to blockade and siege the fortress of Kiliya. Panin did not accept Rumyantsev's considerations, and in the future this circumstance predetermined the hostile relationship between the two commanders. The Turkish garrison of the Bendery fortress continued to actively resist and carry out counter-mine work. Each of the undermining under the Russian positions ended with a powerful explosion and an attack from the fortress.
On August 29, as a result of the explosion of a powerful Turkish mine, one of the Russian mine galleries was destroyed. Under the rubble were up to a company of grenadiers. Turkish troops attacked the advanced positions of the army of P.I. Panin. But this sortie was repulsed. Intensive underground work continued on both sides. On September 8, Russians and Turks ran into each other in the underground galleries, and a lively firefight ensued. From the beginning of September, Count P.I. Panin began to actively prepare for the assault. Despite the lack of ammunition, P.I. Panin ordered to intensify the artillery shelling of the fortress. Artillery cannonade was supposed to drown out the noise from underground work, which was already carried out near the fortifications. The sappers moved on to the most time-consuming and crucial part of the work - the construction and laying of a "reinforced forge", which the military also called a "squeezed ball". A horn of similar strength in the 18th century. in military practice it was used only once - during the siege of the Schweidinz fortress in 1762. The result then turned out to be unsuccessful.
On the eve of the assault, diversionary maneuvers were carried out in order to give the enemy a false impression of the direction of the main attack.
All three galleries approached the fortress wall of the moat from the west. The right gallery was brought under the fifth bastion, the left - under the sixth, corner. The central, main gallery was in the middle of the above-mentioned bastions, to the left of the Ordynsky (Georgievsky) gates.
On September 3, an explosion of the left powder mine thundered. It led to the destruction of the glacis (sloping embankment) in front of the outer moat. On September 6, the outer wall of the ditch was destroyed by the explosion of the right powder mine. These two explosions were only a prelude to decisive action. Russian soldiers fortified the craters formed from the explosions of two mines and turned them into a kind of springboard for the assault.
On September 14, work was completed in the main gallery, miners laid a forge weighing 400 pounds (6552 kg.) of gunpowder. Around 10 pm on September 15, there was a deafening explosion. A huge funnel with a diameter of more than 25 meters was formed. During this explosion of the forge, a part of the counterscarp (ditch wall) filled up a significant piece of the outer ditch. The resulting embankment was used by the storming troops as a kind of bridge. Russian gunners from their positions opened a powerful fire from all guns. The city was bombarded with incendiary bombs and frames delivered to the troops on the eve of the assault.
An analysis of publications covering the assault on the Bendery fortress on September 15–16, 1770 indicates the need for a deeper and more careful study of the tactics of storming fortresses in the 18th century. Very often, researchers have a rough idea of how the capture of the fortress by Russian troops was carried out and what was the meaning of underground powder mines. For example, N.A. Mokhov noted that a part of the fortress wall was destroyed by an underground mine on September 15, and an assault on the fortress began through the gap formed. “At the same time, fortifications in other places were stormed,” the historian continued, “filling up the ditches with bundles of brushwood, the soldiers climbed the walls under fire on the stairs.” The interpretation of events given by Mokhov raised doubts in another researcher, G. Atsvakhaturov.
The width of the outer fortress varies from 10 to 30 meters, and the height was more than 5 meters. Fascine is a bundle of rods, a bunch of brushwood tied with twisted rods, ropes, etc. There are light and heavy fascines. The latter (5-10 meters long and 0.6-1.2 meters in diameter) are filled with large pebbles, rubble and others. Harvesting the required number of fascines was a very laborious and difficult task in the conditions of the steppe region. The assault on the Bendery fortress was in many ways a unique phenomenon in the military affairs of that time. The number of troops storming the fortress was inferior to the number of defenders of the fortress, only 14 infantry regiments participated in the assault. Russian troops rushed to storm the fortress in three columns. The middle column quickly passed the main outer fortress ditch along the formed embankment. The soldiers put ladders to the defensive front, trying to reach the position of the defenders as quickly as possible. One of the first to climb the walls of the fortress was the commander of the Tambov regiment, Colonel M. Miller. The fortress, western Horde gates, bound with iron, turned out to be so strong that all attempts to blow up or cut them ended in failure. Stepping back from the gate, the two columns reformed and followed the main column. The Turks continued to resist, gradually retreating towards the castle. The fighting took on a fierce character. In an effort to delay the advance of the Russian troops, the Turks themselves often set fire to buildings during the retreat.
A Turkish detachment of 1,500 men attempted to break through to Akkerman. He left the Lower Fortress and attacked the flank of the 2nd Russian Army. The Turks broke through the line of defense of the Russian troops and attacked an unprotected convoy. The commander had to give the order to withdraw part of his forces to eliminate the breakthrough. At 9 am on September 16, the garrison of the fortress surrendered to the mercy of the victors. Participant of the assault Colonel G.E. von Strandman left the following description of this event: “Finally, at 9 o’clock, the Turks put up a white flag in the castle, threw weapons over the wall and asked for permission to surrender to surrender. I forbade our people to shoot and went to the castle myself to talk to the seraskir. After half an hour of negotiations conducted by me through Mustafa Pasha, who spoke German well, I chose several deputies and sent them to General Kamensky, who immediately arrived here himself and forced the enemy to a quick surrender. The Turks demanded a free passage across the Danube, to which Kamensky did not agree, after which the Turks were finally disarmed and sent to the count. However, solemnly enter the conquered fortress Count P.I. Panin could not. A strong fire was burning in the fortress, which engulfed almost all the buildings inside the fortress. The explosion of powder magazines led to severe destruction. Fearing even greater losses, P.I. Panin gave the order to urgently withdraw troops and captured Turks from the burning city. For the next three days, it was impossible to approach the burning fortress. The fortress and the city were almost completely destroyed. For the entire time of the siege and assault, Russian troops lost 1,672 people. killed and 4,564 wounded. The losses of the Turks killed amounted to about 5 thousand people.
In addition to the Panin army itself, numerous volunteers who arrived from the 1st army of Rumyantsev took part in the assault on the fortress, among whom was the future field marshal, and then captain M.I. Kutuzov, who was awarded the title of Prime Major for his heroism during the assault.
After the capture of Bendery, at the military council of the 2nd Army, it was decided to abandon the organization of the siege of Ochakov this year due to heavy losses and lack of supplies, fodder and food.
On October 6, the 2nd Army retreated beyond the Dnieper to winter quarters. By order of P.I. Panin in Bendery, a garrison of 5 thousand people was stationed. Colonel I.A. was appointed the first commandant of the city. Corret, who was tasked with starting the restoration of fortifications. The captured Turks were sent to the Novorossiysk provinces for temporary residence there. To ensure the dispatch of prisoners and their property to their place of residence, the Russian command allocated more than 600 carts. Seraskir Mehmet-Emin was provided with a carriage, and carriages were provided for the main Turkish commanders. The capture of Bendery opened the way for the Russian army to the Balkans, the Russian troops on the Danube could no longer be afraid of being stabbed in the back. P.I. Panin expected to receive a field marshal's baton for his services. However, Catherine II, having received a report about the capture of the Bendery fortress, was extremely unhappy when she learned about the losses of Russian troops and the terrible destruction in the fortress and the city: “It was better not to take Bender at all than to lose so much and gain so little.” The Empress awarded P.I. Panin with the Order of St. George, 1st class. Count P.I. Panin considered it an insult to himself and asked for his resignation. On November 19, Catherine II accepted his resignation.
The siege and storming of the Bendery fortress in 1770 had a strong influence on the fate of the famous historical figure - Yemelyan Pugachev. He served in the Cossack regiment of Kuteynikov, distinguished himself during the assault and received a number of serious wounds. Later, using his combat experience, E.I. Pugachev and his comrades organized the most powerful Cossack-peasant uprising in the history of Russia in the 18th century. The rebel detachments managed not only to capture a number of fortresses, but also to defeat government troops aimed at suppressing the uprising. Experts believe that E.I. Pugachev used the Bendery experience during the siege and assault of Russian cities during the peasant war of 1774-1775. A.I. Andrushchenko noted that the first signs of E.I. Pugachev began to show up already near Bendery, declaring to his colleagues that he was the godson of Peter I, who allegedly gave him a golden saber.
According to the Kyuchuk-Kaynarji peace treaty of 1774, the Bendery fortress was returned to the Ottoman Empire. The Turkish authorities decided to move the residence of the seraskir from Bendery to Izmail, which probably affected the rate of restoration of the fortress. The Turkish population of Bender lived in captivity on the outskirts of St. Petersburg. The repatriation dragged on for a year and a half. On February 1, 1776, a column of prisoners led by the former commandant of the Bendery fortress Mehmet Pasha and the former seraskir Ibrahim Pasha nevertheless set off on the return journey. The Russian command provided the prisoners with transport and food on the road. What was the surprise of the convoy when, upon the arrival of the convoy to the border of Turkish possessions in Balta, it turned out that no one was waiting for it from the Turkish side. The former prisoners, including women and children, walked the path from Balta to Bendery.
So for the first time in its history, in September 1770, the most powerful Turkish fortress in the Northern Black Sea region, Bendery, fell to Russian weapons. Although the fortress was then returned to the Ottomans, the path for Russia to Moldavia and the Balkans had already been outlined and paved, which will later be shown by the events of the conquest of the Bendery fortress by the army of G.A. Potemkin in 1789 and finally the corps of K.I. Meyendorff in 1806.
Schedule and involvement of the regiments of the Army of Peter Panin in the company of 1770
| No. p / p | Name of the regiment | In whose jurisdiction was | Total population | Which corps was included | Tasks and what positions he occupied during the siege | Participation in the assault |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| REGULAR ARMY | ||||||
| 1 | Rostov Carabinieri | Major General Zorich | 914 | main forces | in the line of regiments on the Borisov heights to block the fortress from the west, 4 squadrons on the right flank | There is no information from the Combat Operations Journal about participation in the assault. There is evidence in the literature that the personnel of the regiment captured one of the artillery batteries during the assault on the fortress |
| 2 | Yamburg carabinieri | Major General Zorich | 857 | corps of Kamensky | blocking the fortress from the left bank of the Dniester, from the east | There is no information about participation in the assault |
| 3 | Pskov Carabinieri | Major General Count Musin-Pushkin | 874 | main forces | in the line of regiments on the Borisov heights to block the fortress from the west | There is no information about participation in the assault |
| 4 | Borisoglebsky Dragoon | Major General Prince Prozorovsky | 894 | Corps Prozorovsky | protection of the army from an attack from the left bank - the Wild Field, searches against the Tatars and Turks from the side of Gadzhibey | |
| 5 | Astrakhan Dragoon | Major General Romanus | 866 | Berg Corps | blocking the Tatars from the Crimea, at a considerable distance from the main army | |
| 6 | 2nd Grenadier Infantry | Major General Kamensky | 1655 | main forces | in the line of regiments on the Borisov Heights to block the fortress from the west, protect the Main Apartment and Headquarters | four companies to reinforce the central assault column, under the command of Colonel Miller, general leadership of the column, major generals St. Mark and Olsufiev |
| 7 | Voronezh Infantry | Major General Olsufiev | 1706 | corps of Kamensky | blocking the fortress from the left bank of the Dniester, from the east | one company - the right assault column under the command of Colonel Wasserman, the general leadership of the column - Major General Kamensky; one company - the central assault column under the command of Colonel Miller, the general leadership of the column - Major Generals St. Mark and Olsufiev |
| 8 | Chernihiv Infantry | Major General Lebel | 1704 | main forces, 3rd Corps | in the line of regiments on the Borisov Heights to block the fortress from the west, protect the Main Apartment and Headquarters | one company - the right assault column under the command of Colonel Wasserman, the general leadership of the column - Major General Kamensky; one company - the central assault column under the command of Colonel Miller, the general leadership of the column - Major Generals St. Mark and Olsufiev |
| 9 | Vladimir (ov) Infantry | Major General Lebel | 1991 | main forces | in the line of regiments on the Borisov Heights to block the fortress from the west, protect the Commissariat and the camp of engineers | the left assault column under the command of Colonel Korf, the general leadership of the column is Major General Musin-Pushkin; one company under the command of Colonel Protasov |
| 10 | Bele (c) (sun) cue infantry | Major General Kamensky | 1951 | corps of Kamensky | blocking the fortress from the left bank of the Dniester, from the east | the left assault column under the command of Colonel Korf, the general leadership of the column is Major General Musin-Pushkin; one company - right assault column under the command of Colonel Wasserman, general leadership of the column - Major General Kamensky |
| 11 | Bryansk Infantry | Major General Olsufiev | 1901 | main forces | in the line of regiments on the Borisov Heights to block the fortress from the west, protect the Commissariat and the camp of engineers | eighteen companies in reinforcements of the central assault column, under the command of Colonel Miller, general leadership of the column, Major Generals St. Mark and Olsufiev |
| 12 | Yelets Infantry | Major General Olsufiev | 2008 | main forces | Blocking the fortress from the north, protecting the constructed crossing and communications between the left and right banks | the right assault column under the command of Colonel Wasserman, the general leadership of the column is Major General Kamensky; part of the companies in reinforcements of the central assault column, under the command of Colonel Miller, general leadership of the column, major generals St. Mark and Olsufiev |
| 13 | Kozlovsky Infantry | Major General Burman | 2027 | main forces | in the line of regiments on the Borisov heights to block the fortress from the west | the right assault column under the command of Colonel Wasserman, the general leadership of the column is Major General Kamensky; one company left assault column under the command of Colonel Protasov |
| 14 | Kursk infantry | Major General Lebel | 1948 | main forces | in the line of regiments on the Borisov heights to block the fortress from the west | the right assault column under the command of Colonel Wasserman, the general leadership of the column is Major General Kamensky; part of the companies in reinforcements of the central assault column, under the command of Colonel Miller, general leadership of the column, major generals St. Mark and Olsufiev |
| 15 | Orlovsky Infantry | Major General Burman | 1969 | main forces | in the line of regiments on the Borisov heights to block the fortress from the west | one company - the left assault column under the command of Colonel Protasov; 18 companies in reinforcements of the central assault column, under the command of Colonel Miller, general leadership of the column, Major Generals St. Mark and Olsufiev |
| 16 | Ryazhsky infantry | Major General Lebel | 1926 | main forces | in the line of regiments on the Borisov heights to block the fortress from the west | the right assault column under the command of Colonel Wasserman, the general leadership of the column is Major General Kamensky; part of the companies in reinforcements of the central assault column, under the command of Colonel Miller, general leadership of the column, major generals St. Mark and Olsufiev |
| 17 | Sevsky Infantry | Major General Saint Mark | 1914 | main forces | in the line of regiments on the Borisov Heights to block the fortress from the west, protecting the right flank | the left assault column under the command of Colonel Korf, one company under the command of Colonel Protasov, the general leadership of the column is Major General Musin-Pushkin; part of the companies in reinforcements of the central assault column, under the command of Colonel Miller, general leadership of the column, major generals St. Mark and Olsufiev |
| 18 | Starooskol Infantry | Major General Saint Mark | 2027 | main forces | in the line of regiments on the Borisov Heights to block the fortress from the west, protecting the right flank | one company - the left assault column under the command of Colonel Protasov; one company - the central assault column under the command of Colonel Miller; 18 companies in reinforcements of the central assault column, under the command of Colonel Miller, general leadership of the column, Major Generals St. Mark and Olsufiev |
| 19 | Tambov Infantry | Commander Colonel Matthias Miller. Major General Kamensky | 1909 | main forces | Blocking the fortress from the north, protecting the constructed crossing and communications between the left and right banks | 18 companies in reinforcements of the central assault column, under the command of Colonel Miller, general leadership of the column, Major Generals St. Mark and Olsufiev |
| 20 | Jaeger Corps | Major General on duty Prince Shcherbatov | 926 | part of the rangers in the Kamensky corps, part in the main forces | blocking the fortress from the left bank of the Dniester, from the east and blocking the fortress from the north | 1 division - right assault column under the command of Major Mufel; 1 division - the left assault column under the command of Major Palen |
| 21 | Field artillery, forage and pontoon teams | divided into corps and brigades | 1248 | |||
| 22 | Engineering teams | distributed among corps and brigades. General leadership General-engineer Gerbel | 171 | |||
| Total regular | 33386 | |||||
| IRREGULAR ARMY | ||||||
| 1 | Sumy hussar | commander Colonel Tutomilin. When the army was advanced, Major General, Count Musin-Pushkin, upon arrival in Bender, Major General Kamensky | 815 | the corps of Major General Count Musin-Pushkin, later the corps of Major General Kamensky, later the corps of Prince Prozorovsky | upon arrival in Bendery, the regiment took up positions on the left bank of the Dniester River in the Kamensky corps for artillery shelling of the fortress and control of the crossing. On August 19, he was sent to Bolshoi Kuyalnik (Hadzhibey) to the Prozorovsky corps to block the Tatar Khan Bakhti Giray | |
| 2 | Izyum Hussar | Major General Zorich | 1016 | 2 brigade | in the line of regiments on the Borisov heights to block the fortress from the west | During the assault, he was at the heights to protect the rear, flanks and army headquarters. Participated in the extermination of the Turkish cavalry, which, during the assault, escaped from the fortress through the lower gate and rushed to the main army headquarters with the aim of further breaking through to Akkerman |
| 3 | Black hussar | Major General Count Musin-Pushkin | 842 | corps of Major General Musin-Pushkin, 2 squadrons Shcherbatov's corps, 2 squadrons Prozorovsky's corps | 5 squadrons are the main forces in the line of regiments on the Borisov heights to block the fortress from the west, 2 squadrons are the defense of the army from the Wild Field | Musin-Pushkin and Shcherbatov's corps broke into the fortress, after the Russian troops captured the fortress gates |
| 4 | Yellow (Golden) Hussar | Major General Shcherbatov, Major General Prozorovsky | 843 | 3 squadrons the corps of Major General Shcherbatov, the rest of the Prozorovsky corps | 3 squadrons - the main forces in the line of regiments on the Borisov heights to block the fortress from the west, the remaining squadrons - the protection of the army from the Wild Field | Shcherbatov's corps broke into the fortress, after the Russian troops captured the fortress gates |
| 5 | Bakhmutsky (Bakhmuchesky) hussar | Major General Romanus | 843 | Berg Corps | blocking the Tatars from the Crimea, at a considerable distance from the main army | |
| 6 | Lugansk pikeman | Major General Romanus | 641 | Berg Corps | blocking the Tatars from the Crimea, at a considerable distance from the main army | |
| 7 | Donetsk pikemen | Major General Romanus | 1476 | Berg Corps | blocking the Tatars from the Crimea, at a considerable distance from the main army | |
| 8 | Dnieper pikeman | Major General Shcherbatov, Major General Prozorovsky | 1052 | 2 squadrons with Major General Shcherbatov, 1 squadron with Major General Prozorovsky | 2 squadrons - the main forces on the Borisov heights to block the fortress from the west, 1 squadron to protect the army from the Wild Field | Shcherbatov's squadrons broke into the fortress, after the Russian troops captured the fortress gates |
| 9 | Eliz (c) Avetgrad pikeman | Major General Zorich | 1114 | main forces | in the line of regiments on the Borisov heights to block the fortress from the west, distributed along the entire line | broke into the fortress, after the Russian troops captured the fortress gates |
| 10 | Don Cossack Army Kolchakov Regiment | divided into corps and brigades | 518 | divided into corps and brigades | various | guarding the camp along the heights, reserve for the attackers, blocking the suburb. Destruction of the Turks who escaped from the fortress |
| 11 | Don Cossack Host Gorbikov Regiment | divided into corps and brigades | 497 | divided into corps and brigades | various | guarding the camp along the heights, reserve for the attackers, blocking the suburb. Destruction of the Turks who escaped from the fortress |
| 12 | Don Cossack Army Ataman Grekov Regiment | divided into corps and brigades | 3207 | divided into corps and brigades | various | guarding the camp along the heights, reserve for the attackers, blocking the suburb. Destruction of the Turks who escaped from the fortress |
| 13 | Little Russian Mirgorodsky | Major General Zorich and Major General Musin-Pushkin | 716 | distributed among corps and brigades, mainly the main forces | various | broke into the fortress, after the Russian troops captured the fortress gates |
| 14 | Little Russian Galitsky (Gadyatsky, (Gadyachsky) | Major General Zorich and Major General Musin-Pushkin | 1153 | distributed among corps and brigades, mainly the main forces | various | broke into the fortress, after the Russian troops captured the fortress gates |
| 15 | Little Russian Starodubovsky | Major General Zorich and Major General Musin-Pushkin | 829 | distributed among corps and brigades, mainly the main forces | various | broke into the fortress, after the Russian troops captured the fortress gates |
| 16 | Little Russian Chernigov | Major General Zorich and Major General Musin-Pushkin | 965 | distributed among corps and brigades, mainly the main forces | various | broke into the fortress, after the Russian troops captured the fortress gates |
| 17 | Little Russian Lubenskoy | Major General Zorich and Major General Musin-Pushkin | 1023 | distributed among corps and brigades, mainly the main forces | various | broke into the fortress, after the Russian troops captured the fortress gates |
| 18 | Little Russian Nezhinsky | Major General Zorich and Major General Musin-Pushkin | 1981 | distributed among corps and brigades, mainly the main forces | various | broke into the fortress, after the Russian troops captured the fortress gates |
| 19 | Little Russian Companion | Major General Zorich and Major General Musin-Pushkin | 471 | distributed among corps and brigades, mainly the main forces | various | broke into the fortress, after the Russian troops captured the fortress gates |
| 20 | Mounted Kalmyks | Major General Prozorovsky | 5000 | Corps Prozorovsky | actions against the Tatars in the Gadzhibey area | |
| Total irregular | 25002 | |||||
| Whole army | 58388 | |||||
