Home / THE MARCH OF THE RUSSIAN TROOPS TO THE DNIESTER RIVER, THE SIEGE AND ASSAULT OF THE OTTOMAN FORTRESS BENDERY IN 1770

... THE MARCH OF THE RUSSIAN TROOPS TO THE DNIESTER RIVER, THE SIEGE AND ASSAULT OF THE OTTOMAN FORTRESS BENDERY IN 1770 ...

In the second half of the XVIII century, the Bendery fortress was a stronghold of Turkish rule in the Prut-Dniester region. On the eve and at the beginning of the Russian-Turkish war, which began in 1769, in Bendery there was the residence of seraskier, who commanded all the Turkish troops and garrisons of fortresses in Ochakov province, on the entire North-Western coast of the Black sea.

The results of the campaign of 1769 caused serious discontent in St. Petersburg. The commander of the 1st Russian army, Prince A. Golitsyn, surrounded by Empress Catherine II, was accused of failing to take advantage of the results of his victories over the Turkish troops and develop a strategic success. Indeed, the defeated remnants of the Turkish troops at the Raby Grave by Russians under the leadership of General P. Rumyantsev managed to retreat across the Danube, where they were restoring their fighting capacity. In the Moldavian Principality, the population revolt that had developed when the Russians entered was suppressed. The fortress of Khotyn, which had been taken by units under Golitsyn's command, was abandoned, and the Russian troops were withdrawn beyond the Dniester river. Large Turkish detachments remained in the fortresses of Bendery, Ochakov, Kilia and Izmail. The Crimean cavalry was assembled at the headquarters of the Khan of the Budjak Tatars in Kaushany, South-West of Bender, and prepared for war with the Russians. Prince A. Golitsyn was deposed, and the command of the 1st army was assigned by the Empress to General P. Rumyantsev.

In addition to the victory at the Raby Grave, Rumyantsev was known as the organizer of the repulse in 1769 of the Crimean Tatar cavalry raid on the southern borders of Novorossiya. Then the actions of the troops under the command of Rumyantsev allowed to bind large Ottoman forces in Bessarabia and thereby disrupt the plans of the Turkish command.

The pick of Pyotr Panin for commander of the 2nd Russian army could be explained by contemporaries as General-anshef P. Panin was the brother of the actual head of the Russian government, Nikita Panin. Despite the high rank of General-in-chief, he had no military victories. However, when developing the 1770 campaign plan, the Military Council under the Empress set very important tasks for the 2nd Russian army. According to the campaign plan, the 2nd army was assigned the followings: conquering the Turkish fortresses of Bendery, Akkerman. Ochakov, Kilia, and Izmail; it was also charged with guarding the entire southern border of Russia from Tatar raids. The command of the Russian army considered the capture of the Turkish fortresses of Bendery and Ochakov as a prelude to the crossing of the Danube and the exit of Russian troops to the Balkan Peninsula.

The plans of the Military Council under the Empress presented the capture of the Bendery fortress as a task that Russian
генерал-аншеф П.И. Панин troops could solve with a single strong assault. "Bendery," Catherine II noted in a rescript addressed to count P.Panin,"can hardly hold out for long." In a letter dated October 14 to his brother Nikita, Pyotr Panin regarded the task assigned to him as extremely difficult: "to carry the heavy guns assigned to the siege artillery there in the current weather and on the local Philistine horses, I do not find it at all possible. For as much as sieges are useful and glorious with a sufficient establishment, so in contrast to that they are unprofitable and unsuccessful, and our army will be especially inglorious if it is also shown to the world a new failure in them."

However, the order had to be obeyed. When developing a campaign plan for the 2nd army, the Commander of Russian Army tried to take into account the lessons of Russian troops’ campaigns in the Black Sea region during the previous Russo-Turkish war. The experience of the actions of the army of General H. Minich in 1738 against Turkish fortresses showed the need for careful preparation and provision of troops with everything necessary. Due to the complexity of the tasks assigned to the troops, Panin intended to increase the number of the 2nd Russian army including the services that ensure the actions of the troops-to 100 thousand people, and divide it into three separate corps. The combat strength of the 2nd army was to be increased to 60 thousand soldiers and officers.

During the two winter months of 1770, the 2nd army was actively preparing for a heavy campaign through the steppe regions from the Southern Bug to the Dniester river. Food stores were established to provide the army with food on the Bug river and in Novorossiya. Large mobile stores were formed in Yelisavetgrad and Bakhmut. A wagon train with a two-month supply of food was organized for each regiment. To ensure the delivery of supplies to the troops, a proper number of horses and oxen were purchased. For the construction of pontoon bridges and crossings of P. Panin ordered to prepare a sufficient amount of scaffolding in advance.

According to Panin's plan, the 1st and 2nd corps were to operate on the right bank of the Dnieper. After crossing the Bug, the 1st corps, according to the original plan of 25 thousand bayonets and sabers, was supposed to prevent the acts of the Ottomans on the borders of Russia and the rear of the main forces of the 2nd army from the Ochakov direction. The 2nd corps, numbering 35 thousand soldiers, was ordered to capture the enemy's fortresses on the Dniester provided that Rumyantsev's army successfully operated against the main forces of the Ottoman Porte. Otherwise, the corps must link up with the 1st army in order to defeat the main enemy forces. After that, the corps could begin to capture the Turkish fortresses. A separate corps under the command of Lieutenant General M. Berg, designed to cover the southern borders of Russia and conduct sabotage in the Crimean direction, restricting the actions of the Tatar troops, numbered 21 thousand soldiers and officers and was deployed on the left bank of the Dnieper.

By the beginning of the campaign in 1770, the 2nd Russian army, despite all expectations, had half as many troops as planned by the General staff and Panin himself. Regular, i.e., the most trained troops, were about 33 thousand, which included infantry regiments, engineering, artillery and pontoon teams. Irregular troops consisting of Pikemen, Hussars, Little Russian Regiments, as well as Regiments of the Cossack Don army were about 22 thousand. Already at the approach to the crossing point on the Dniester river in the Dubossary area, the army was joined by 5,000 Kalmyk cavalry. As already mentioned above, Panin was forced to allocate troops to the Berg corps, and troops were also allocated to the special Prozorovsky corps, designed to operate on the left Bank of the Dniester and cover the army from the Tatars and Turks from Ochakov and Hajibey. In addition, when the army moved to Dubossary, Panin had to leave guards for stores (warehouses) created during the movement, small earthworks designed to ensure the safe delivery of necessary supplies for the army. I.e., the commander allocated large forces to ensure the security of communications of his troops. There were also 197 canons.

100 pontoons were made to force water barriers. Due to the insufficient number of personnel, P. Panin adjusted the initial campaign plan, reallocating troops to solve priority tasks. St. Petersburg tried to resolve the conflict with the Crimean khanate by peace. On behalf of Catherine II, Panin tried to start negotiations with the Tatar khans and murzas in order to " make a test of whether it would be possible to shake the Crimea and all the Tatar peoples in their loyalty to the Port." To help Panin, the Secretary of the Board of foreign Affairs, Ravich, and the adviser to the office, Veselitsky, were sent from the Board Of foreign Affairs. In accordance with the instructions received from St. Petersburg, the count sent letters to the Crimean Khan and many murzas and to ordinary Tatars of the steppe hordes. Panin wrote in the letters, "that her Majesty's sincere desire is that the Crimea and all the Tatar hordes belonging to it should be given a prosperous existence for all time, independent of any power, which Russia guarantees with its patronage." If the Tatars were willing to renounce their vassalage to the Ottoman Porte, the commander of the 2nd army ordered, they should send delegates to negotiate. Otherwise, Panin, remembering the actions of the Tatars during the raids on Russian lands, threatened to destroy their nomad camps and settlements.

Even before the start of the campaign, in 1769, having insufficient information about the fortress and the area in which the army was supposed to enter, a corps under the command of Christian Wittgenstein was sent to Bendery, consisting of 4 battalions and one regiment of Dragoons, to which General Zorich's detachment was also attached. The main task of this corps was to scout and collect information about the fortress, its garrison, fortification, as well as the intensity of the Turkish-Tatar troops at the crossing point on the Dniester river and in the area when approaching the fortress. Moreover, having insufficient information about the enemy, Wittgenstein was prescribed a completely adventurous task, if possible, by the forces of the corps, and even take Bendery, if possible. As a result of this raid, when approaching Bendery, the corps got bogged down in skirmishes with the Turkish-Tatar cavalry, but by interviewing local residents and captured prisoners, it managed to collect information that the fortress is well fortified, its garrison exceeds 10 thousand combat-ready troops with four hundred guns. The fact that special hopes were placed on Wittgenstein's corps is indicated by a phrase in a letter to Panin's brother, where he wrote "as a maternity hospital, I am waiting for a report from him." Thanks to the information gathered, Panin realized that Bendery could not be taken without a proper siege and that there could be no question of a rapid, unprepared assault on the fortress.  

Panin's army marched on March 20, 1770. Due to the heavy spring thaw, its progress was slow. River flooding forced the construction of bridges on stilts, even in places where there were small streams before. On June 28, the army's advanced detachments approached the Dniester river North of Dubossary. "I received the happiness of the first of the Russian generals in the month of June, not only not with a ruined, but how small, so best, and in no way weakened army to cross the Dniester river, " he wrote to his brother Nikita Panin. To completely encircle and block the fortress, the commander of the 2nd army divided it into two detachments. On July 2, the detachment of General M. Kamensky, without crossing to the right Bank of the river. The Dniester river, on the left Bank, moved to the village of Parkany, located directly opposite the fortress, to block it and launch artillery attacks from the East.

On July 6, a floating bridge on galleys was built across the Dniester river forthe main army forces and siege artillery to cross in the North of Dubossary, near the villages of Roghi and Doibany. In order to stop the progressing of Russian troops, the garrison of the Bendery fortress made a number of sorties. On July 7, the Turks, numbering up to a thousand fighters, attacked a Cossack unit from the detachment of M. Kamensky. Met with a rebuff from the Cossacks, the Turkish detachment hastily retreated. However, on July 10, the Turks attacked the positions of the main forces of count P. Panin's army on the Bîc river. 

On July 15, the main forces of the 2nd army approached Bendery. The Russians were completely surprised by the fact that a whole line of Turkish fortifications was discovered far beyond the fortress itself, which covered the fortress in a semicircle and before breaking through to its walls, they had to initially break through this well-fortified line (retrashement). Already during the siege and the information gathered, it became known that Panin was opposed by forces not inferior to him in number - 30 thousands of theTurks against his 33 thousands.  

On the approach to Bendery, Panin divided his army into five columns and proceeded to completely encircle and block the fortress at a distance from the Turkish retrashement line. Three columns are located North of the fortress. Two columns, having made a detour, surrounded it from the South. On the left Bank of the Dniester river, the crossing was occupied by a detachment of General M.Kamensky. In order to prevent the fortress from being completely blocked, the Turks attacked the right flank of the 2nd Russian army on July 15. Seeing the retreat of his vanguard, P. Panin sent reinforcements and attacked the Turks from three sides. The enemy could not withstand the rapid counterattack and retreated to the fortress. Pursuing the retreating Turkish detachment, Russian troops approached the outer moat of the fortress, and tried to break into the city. However, Panin stopped the troops, explaining his actions as "the fear of infection." After reviewing the situation in the fortress and garrison in more detail, Panin abandoned the idea of an immediate assault, and began the siege.

Russian troops were to gradually bring their positions as close as possible to the fortress under the cover of artillery. The plan of mine work was developed by Engineer General Rodion Gerbel, who was sent to the 2nd army with the task of dealing with siege work. He fortified the camp in Bendery and developed a plan for the siege of the fortress. In fact, it was an engineering plan to capture the enemy fortifications.  

Later, this operation, which became the only such case in the history of Russian siege art, was called the "underground war". All the siege work was carried out under his direct supervision clearly and smoothly and led to the expected result. Panin's caution was not without reason. On August 4, he reminded his brother that he did not have superior forces: "... conclusions about our appeals against the enemy ...unrighteous and false ...Could it be already ... what a saving ...where the enemy in the fortress, being almost level, with their infantry, besieging...". At night, Russian troops dug trenches, and during the day they shelled the fortress. The first mass artillery bombardment was carried out on July 21 and then was carried out almost daily with the participation of batteries from the left Bank, which fired primarily at the approaches from the Water Gates to the Dniester river. This immediately affected the city's water supply. Defectors from the fortress said that the price of water in Bendery had risen sharply.  

In order to undermine the morale of the garrison, P. Panin sent 9 captured Turks with the news of the victory of P. Rumyantsev's troops at the Larga river on July 7, 1770 and with an offer to surrender. Seraskier (military chief) Mohammed Uji Valasi rejected the proposal. However,  seraskier died suddenly a few days later. At the General Council, the Turkish military leaders asked the Pasha Mehmet Emin, who was in the fortress, to take command of the garrison.

Sorties of the Turkish garrison continued. First of all, the Turks sought to prevent the conduct of earthworks and the construction of trenches and batteries. Describing the constant skirmishes with the garrison, Panin wrote in a letter to his brother: "it's been six days in a row ...makes the most desperate skirmishes and forces me ...to rush about the whole of your position, which must be very extensively held, but only by ten infantry regiments; your brother, being the chief commander, almost every night ...rarely more to the battle against the enemy ...outputs up to a thousand infantry men."  

On August 1, Panin's army suffered an irreparable and heavy loss. Towards midnight, a large Turkish force attacked the Russian positions and even managed to break through them, and hand-to-hand and bayonet fighting ensued in the trenches. At this time, major General Wilhelm Lebel led the trench work with colonels Kochius and Pavlov, who were the first to organize the defense of the positions, were able to push the Turks back and drive them to the fortress wall. But, as eyewitnesses wrote, General Lebel was careless and was wounded by an enemy bullet due to glacis and died soon after two hours. That night, Russian losses were significant - several senior officers were killed, as well as almost 200 enlisted men, and 473 were wounded.

On the night of August 2 to 3, a Turkish detachment again silently left the fortress and attacked the trenches of Russian troops. The fortress artillery supported the Turkish detachment's sortie with heavy fire from the bastions. Opposed reconnaissance convinced the Turks that the Russian troops are conducting active mine work to undermine their defenses. From that moment on, the garrison's sorties took on a purposeful character: to stop the Russian earthworks. After the day's skirmishes and mutual shootups at night, both sides were working hard to restore what had been destroyed and build new underground galleries. Having learned that a "counter-mine" was also being dug from the fortress, P. Panin ordered to deepen the ditch in front of the most important forward positions of his troops.  

The siege dragged on, and the 2nd army began to experience difficulties in supplying troops. In early August, there was an acute shortage of artillery supplies. The gunners fired no more than 100 rounds a day at the fortress. Pyotr Ivanovich ordered that at night the soldiers should collect the cannonballs. In the middle of the month, there were several days of heavy rains that damaged part of the mine galleries of the Russian army. Panin was forced to keep a large force to cover his troops from the rear and turned for help to the commander of the 1st army, General-in-chief P. A. Rumyantsev. Rumyantsev refused, because he engaged all his troops in the battle of the Larga river with the main forces of the Turkish troops. After the defeat of the Turkish army by the Turkish army at the Cahul river, Panin still feared an Ottoman attack from Akkerman and Kiliya and again requested Rumyantsev's help for the speedy capture of Bendery. Despite the victories in the battles of Larga and Cahul, P. Rumyantsev considered the forces available to him insufficient for the successful continuation of the war.

The replenishment requested by Rumyantsev from Catherine II had not yet arrived from Russia, and he pointed out to Panin in his letter that it was impossible to send Prince N. Repnin's corps to block and besiege the fortress of Kilia. Panin did not accept Rumyantsev's considerations, and in the future this circumstance predetermined the hostile relationship between the two commanders. The Turkish garrison of the Bendery fortress continued to actively resist and conduct counter-mine work. Each of the tunnels under the Russian positions ended with a powerful explosion and an attack from the fortress.  

On August 29, a powerful Turkish mine destroyed one of the Russian mine galleries. Under the rubble were up to a company of grenadiers. Turkish troops attacked the advanced positions of Panin's army. But this sortie was repulsed. Intensive underground work continued on both sides. On September 8, the Russians and Turks clashed with each other in the underground galleries, and a lively skirmish ensued. From the beginning of September, count P. Panin began to actively prepare for the assault. Despite the lack of ammunition, P. Panin ordered to strengthen the artillery bombardment of the fortress. The artillery cannonade was supposed to drown out the noise from underground work that was already being carried out near the fortifications. Sappers moved on to the most time-consuming and responsible part of the work-the construction and laying of the "reinforced horn", which the military also called the "compressed ball". In the XVIII century, a similar horn was used only once in military practice – during the siege of the fortress of Schweidinz in 1762. The result was unsuccessful.  

In the run-up to the assault, diversionary maneuvers were carried out in order to give the enemy a false impression of the direction of the main attack.  

All three galleries came to the wall of the ditch from the West. The right gallery was brought under the fifth bastion, the left - under the sixth, corner. The Central, main gallery was located in the middle of the above-mentioned bastions, to the left of the Horde (St. George's) Gates.  

On September 3, a left-hand powder mine exploded. It led to the destruction of the glacis (sloping embankment) in front of the outer moat. On September 6, the outer wall of the ditch was destroyed by the explosion of a right-hand powder mine. These two explosions were just the prelude to decisive action. Russian soldiers reinforced the craters formed by the explosions of two mines and turned them into a kind of springboard for the assault.  

On September 14, work in the main gallery ended, and a 400-pound (6552 kg) gunpowder horn was laid by miners. Around 10 p.m. on September 15, a deafening explosion was heard. A huge crater with a diameter of more than 25 meters was formed. During this blast of the bugle, part of the counterscarp (ditch wall) covered a significant portion of the outer ditch. The resulting embankment was used by the storming troops as a kind of bridge. Russian gunners from their positions opened a powerful fire from all the guns. The city was shelled with incendiary bombs and carcasses delivered to the troops on the eve of the assault.

Analysis of publications covering the storming of the Bender fortress on September 15-16, 1770, indicates the need for a more in-depth and careful study of the tactics of storming fortresses in the XVIII century. Very often researchers have a rough idea of how the capture of the fortress by Russian troops was carried out and what was the meaning of underground powder mines. For example, N. Mokhov noted that an underground mine on September 15 destroyed part of the fortress wall, and the assault on the fortress began through the resulting breach. "At the same time, the fortifications in other places were stormed," the historian continued,"filling up the ditches with bundles of firewood, the soldiers under fire climbed the stairs to the walls." Mokhov's interpretation of events raised doubts from another researcher, G. Atsvakhaturov.  

The width of the outer fortress varies from 10 to 30 meters, and the height was more than 5 meters. A fascine is a bundle of twigs, tied with ropes, etc. There are light and heavy fascines. The latter (5 – 10 meters long, 0.6 – 1.2 meters in diameter) are filled with large pebbles, rubble, and others. Harvesting the required number of fascines was a very time-consuming and difficult task in the conditions of the steppe region. The storming of the fortress of Bendery was in many ways a unique phenomenon in the military Affairs of that time. The number of troops storming the fortress was inferior to the number of defenders of the fortress, only 14 infantry regiments participated in the assault. Russian troops rushed to storm the fortress in three columns. The middle column quickly passed the main outer moat along the embankment that had been formed. Soldiers put ladders to the defensive front, trying to reach the position of the defenders as quickly as possible. One of the first to climb the walls of the fortress was the commander of the Tambov regiment, Colonel M. Miller. The Western Horde Gates, bound with iron, were so strong that all attempts to blow up or cut them ended in failure. Retreating from the gate, the two columns re-formed and followed the main column. The Turks continued to resist, gradually retreating to the castle. The fighting became fierce. In an effort to delay the advance of Russian troops, the Turks often set fire to buildings themselves during the retreat.

A Turkish detachment of 1,500 men attempted to break through to Akkerman. He left the Lower fortress and attacked the flank of the 2nd Russian army. The Turks broke through the line of defense of the Russian troops and attacked the unprotected wagon train. The commander had to order the withdrawal of part of his forces to eliminate the breakthrough. At 9 a.m. on September 16, the garrison of the fortress surrendered to the mercy of the victors. A participant in the assault, Colonel G. E. von Strandmann, left the following description of the event: "Finally, at 9 o'clock, the Turks put up a white flag in the castle, threw their weapons over the wall and asked permission to surrender. I forbade our men to shoot, and went myself to the castle to speak with seraskier. After half an hour of negotiations, conducted by me through the medium of Mustafa Pasha, who spoke German well, I selected several deputies and sent them to General Kamensky, who immediately arrived here himself and forced the enemy to a quick surrender. The Turks demanded a free pass across the Danube, to which Kamensky did not agree, after which the Turks were finally disarmed and sent to the count." However, Panin could not enter into the conquered fortress officially. A strong fire was burning in the fortress, which engulfed almost all the buildings inside the fortress. The explosion of the powder magazines led to severe destruction. Fearing even greater losses, P. Panin ordered an urgent withdrawal of troops and captured Turks from the burning city. For the next three days, the burning fortress could not be approached. The fortress and city were almost completely destroyed. During the entire siege and assault, Russian troops lost 1,672 people. 564 killed and 4 wounded. The losses of the Turks killed amounted to about 5 thousand people.  

In addition to Panin's army itself, numerous volunteers from Rumyantsev's 1st army took part in the storming of the fortress, including the future field Marshal, then Captain M. Kutuzov, who was awarded the title of Prime Major for his heroism during the assault. 

After the capture of Bender, the military Council of the 2nd army decided to abandon the organization of the siege of Ochakov this year due to heavy losses and lack of supplies, forage and food.  

On October 6, the 2nd army moved beyond the Dnieper to the winter quarters. By order of Panin, a garrison of 5 thousand people was placed in Bender. The first commandant of the city was appointed Colonel I.Korret, who was assigned the task of starting the restoration of fortifications. The captured Turks were sent to the Novorossiyan provinces for temporary residence. To ensure that the prisoners and their property were sent to their place of stay, the Russian command allocated more than 600 carts. Seraskier Mehmet-Emin was provided with a carriage, and the main Turkish chiefs were provided with strollers.  Russian troops on the Danube could no longer be afraid of a stab in the back, and the capture of Bendery opened the way to the Balkans for the Russian army. P. Panin expected to receive a Field-Marshal's baton for his services. However, Catherine II, having received a report about the capture of the Bendery fortress, was extremely dissatisfied when she learned about the losses of Russian troops and the terrible destruction in the fortress and the city: "Than to lose so much and get so little, it was better not to take Bendery at all." The Empress awarded P. Panin with the order of St. George of1st class. Count Panin considered it an insult and asked for his resignation. On November 19, Catherine II accepted his resignation.

The siege and storming of the Bendery fortress in 1770 had a strong influence on the fate of a famous historical figure – Yemelyan Pugachev. He served in Kuteynikov's Cossack regiment, distinguished himself during the assault and received a number of serious injuries. Later, using their combat experience, E. Pugachev and his comrades organized the most powerful Cossack-peasant uprising in the history of Russia in the XVIII century. Rebel detachments managed not only to capture a number of fortresses, but also to defeat government forces aimed at suppressing the uprising. Experts believe that Pugachev used the Bendery experience in the siege and storming of Russian cities during the peasant war of 1774-1775. A. Andrushchenko noted that the first signs of future imposture E. Pugachev began to show already under the Bendery, stating to colleagues that he was the godson of Peter I, who allegedly gave him a golden saber.  

According to the 1774 The Treaty of Kucuk Kaynarca, the Bendery fortress was returned to the Ottoman Empire. The Turkish authorities decided to move the seraskier residence from Bendery to Izmail, which probably affected the pace of restoration of the fortress. The Turkish population of Bendery lived in captivity on the outskirts of St. Petersburg. The repatriation was delayed for a year and a half. On February 1, 1776, a column of prisoners led by the former commandant of the Bendery fortress Mehmet Pasha and the former seraskier Ibrahim Pasha set off on their return journey. The Russian command provided the prisoners with transport and food on the road. What was the surprise of the convoy when, upon arrival at the border of the Turkish possessions in Balta, it turned out that no one was waiting for it from the Turkish side. The way from Balta to Bendery, former prisoners, including women and children, were on foot.  

So for the first time in its history in September 1770, the most powerful Turkish fortress in the Northern Black Sea region, Bendery, fell to Russian weapons. Although the fortress was then returned to the Ottomans, but the path for Russia to Moldova and the Balkans was already planned and laid out, which will later be shown by the events of the conquest of the Bendery fortress by the army of G. Potemkin in 1789 and finally by the corps of K. Meyendorff in 1806.

 

The publication was prepared by the Scientific Department of the state unitary enterprise "Bendery fortress", in August 2020, for the 250th anniversary of the assault of the fortress by the Russian army of P. Panin

 

APPENDICES

SCHEDULE AND INVOLVEMENT OF THE REGIONS OF PETER PANIN’S ARMY IN THE COMPANY OF 1770

REGULAR TROOPS

Name Of The Regiment

Whose Authority

Total Number

Which Corps Belonged To

Tasks And What Positions Were Occupied During The Siege

Participation in the assault

1

Rostovsky carabiner

Major General  Zorich

914

main forces

in the line of regiments on the Borisov Heights to blockade the fortress from the west, 4 squadrons in the right flank

there is no information from the Combat Operations Log about participation in the assault. There is evidence in the literature that the regiment's personnel captured one of the artillery batteries during the assault on the fortress

2

Yamburgsky carabiner

Major General  Zorich

875

Kamensky’s corps

blocking the fortress from the left bank of the Dniester, from the east

there is no information about participation in the assault.

3

Pskovsky  carabiner

Major General  Count Musin-Pushkin

874

main forces

in the line of regiments on the Borisov Heights to blockade the fortress from the west

there is no information about participation in the assault.

4

Borisoglebsky dragoon

Major General Prince Prozorovsky

894

Prozorovsky's corps

protection of the army from an attack from the left bank - the Wild Field, searches against the Tatars and Turks from Hajibey

 

5

Astrakhansky dragoon

Major General Romanus

866

Berg’s corps

blocking the Tatars from the Crimea, at a considerable distance from the main army

 

6

2nd Grenadier Infantry

Major General Kamensky

1655

main forces

in the line of regiments on the Borisov Heights to blockade the fortress from the west, protection of the main headquarters

four companies to reinforce the central assault column, under the command of Colonel Miller, general leadership of the column, Major Generals Saint- Mark and Olsufiev

7

Voronezhsky infantry

Major General Olsufiev

1706

Kamensky’s corps

blocking the fortress from the left bank of the Dniester, from the east

one company - the right assault column under the command of Colonel Wasserman, the general leadership of the column - Major General Kamensky; one company - the central assault column under the command of Colonel Miller, the general leadership of the column - Major Generals Saint- Mark and Olsufiev

8

Chernigovsky infantry

Major General  Lebel

1704

main forces, 3rd corps

in the line of regiments on the Borisov Heights to block the fortress from the west, protection of the main headquarters

one company - the right assault column under the command of Colonel Wasserman, the general leadership of the column - Major General Kamensky; one company - the central assault column under the command of Colonel Miller, the general leadership of the column - Major Generals Saint-Mark and Olsufiev

9

Vladimirsky infantry

Major General Lebel

1991

Main forces

in the line of regiments on the Borisov Heights to block the fortress from the west, protection of the Commissariat and the camp of engineers

the left assault column under the command of Colonel Korf, the general leadership of the column - Major General Musin-Pushkin; one company under the command of Colonel Protasov

10

Beletsky infantry

Major General Kamensky

1951

Kamensky’s corps

blocking the fortress from the left bank of the Dniester, from the east

the left assault column under the command of Colonel Korf, the general leadership of the column - Major General Musin-Pushkin; one company - the right assault column under the command of Colonel Wasserman, general leadership of the column - Major General Kamensky

11

Bryansky infantry

Major General Olsufiev

1901

main forces

in the line of regiments on the Borisov Heights to blockade the fortress from the west, protection of the Commissariat and the camp of engineers

eighteen companies to reinforce the central assault column, under the command of Colonel Miller, the general leadership of the column, Major Generals Saint -Mark and Olsufiev

12

Eletsky infantry

Major General Olsufiev

2008

main forces

Blocking the fortress from the north, protecting the constructed crossing and communications between the left and right banks

the right assaulting column under the command of Colonel Wasserman, the general leadership of the column - Major General Kamensky; part of the companies to reinforce the central assault column, under the command of Colonel Miller, the general leadership of the column, Major Generals Saint- Mark and Olsufiev

13

Kozlovsky infantry

Major General Burman

2027

main forces

in the line of regiments on the Borisov Heights to block the fortress from the west

the right assault column under the command of Colonel Wasserman, the general leadership of the column - Major General Kamensky; one company left assault column under the command of Colonel Protasov

14

Kursky infantry

Major General Lebel

1948

main forces

in the line of regiments on the Borisov Heights to block the fortress from the west

one company - the left assault column under the command of Colonel Protasov; 18 companies to reinforce the central assault column, under the command of Colonel Miller, general leadership of the column, Major Generals Saint -Mark and Olsufiev

15

Orlovsky infantry

Major General Burman

1969

main forces

in the line of regiments on the Borisov Heights to block the fortress from the west

one company - the left assault column under the command of Colonel Protasov; 18 companies to reinforce the central assault column, under the command of Colonel Miller, general leadership of the column, Major Generals Saint- Mark and Olsufiev

16

Ryajsky infantry

Major General Lebel

1926

main forces

in the line of regiments on the Borisov Heights to block the fortress from the west

one company - the left assault column under the command of Colonel Protasov; 18 companies to reinforce the central assault column, under the command of Colonel Miller, general leadership of the column, Major Generals Saint -Mark and Olsufiev

17

Sevsky infantry

Major General Saint-Mark

1914

main forces

in the line of regiments on the Borisov Heights to block the fortress from the west

one company-left assaulting column under the command of Colonel Protasov; one company - the central assaulting column under the command of Colonel Miller; 18 companies to reinforce the central assault column, under the command of Colonel Miller, general leadership of the column, Major Generals Saint-Mark and Olsufiev

18

Starooskolsky infantry

Major General Saint-Mark

2027

main forces

in the line of regiments on the Borisov Heights to block the fortress from the west

one company-left assaulting column under the command of Colonel Protasov; one company - the central assaulting column under the command of Colonel Miller; 18 companies to reinforce the central assault column, under the command of Colonel Miller, general leadership of the column, Major Generals Saint-Mark and Olsufiev

19

Tambovsky infantry

Colonel Commander M.Miller. Major General Kamensky

1909

main forces

blocking the fortress from the north, protecting the constructed crossing and communications between the left and right banks

18 companies to reinforce the central assault column, under the command of Colonel Miller, general leadership of the column, Major Generals Saint Mark and Olsufiev

20

Jegersky corps

Duty Major General Prince Shcherbatov

926

part of the jegers in the Kamensky corps, part in the main forces

blocking the fortress from the left bank of the Dniester, from the east and blocking the fortress from the north

1 division-right assault column under the command of Major Muffel; 1 division  - left assault column under the command of Major Palen

21

Units of field artillery, feed and pontoon teams

distributed to corps and brigades

1248

 

 

 

22

Engineering teams

distributed among corps and brigades. Main management General Engineer Gerbel

171

 

 

 

 

 

Total of regular troops

33386

 

 

 

IRREGULAR TROOPS

1

Sumy hussar

Commander Colonel Tutomiliin. At the advance of the army, Major General  Count Musin-Pushkin, at the arrival in Bendery – Major General Kamensky

815

the corps of Major General Count Musin-Pushkin, later the corps of Major General Kamensky, later the corps of Prince Prozorovsky

on arrival in Bendery, the regiment took up positions on the left Bank of the Dniester river in the Kamensky's corps for artillery bombardment of the fortress and control of the crossing. On August 19, it was sent to the Big Kuyalnik (Hajibey) in the Prozorovsky's corps to block the Tatar Khan Bahti Geray

 

2

Izyumsky hussar

Major General Zorich

1016

2nd brigade

in the line of regiments on the Borisov Heights to blockade the fortress from the west

During the assault, regiment was at the heights to protect the rear, flanks and headquarters of the army. Participated in the extermination of the Turkish cavalry, which during the assault escaped from the fortress through the lower gate and rushed to the main apartment of the army in order to further break through to Akkerman

3

Black hussar

Major General Count Musin-Pushkin

842

corps of Major General Musin-Pushkin, 2 squadrons of Shcherbatov's corps, 2 squadrons of Prozorovsky's corps

5 squadrons of the main forces in the line of regiments on the Borisov Heights to blockade the fortress from the west, 2 squadrons - defense of the army from the side of the Wild Field

the corps of Musin-Pushkin and Shcherbatov broke into the fortress, after the Russian troops captured the fortress gates

4

Yellow (Gold) Hussar

Major General Shcherbatov, Major General Prozorovsky

843

3 squadrons corps of Major General Shcherbatov, the rest of the corps of Prozorovsky

3 squadrons - the main forces in the line of regiments on the Borisov Heights to block the fortress from the west, the rest of the squadrons - the defense of the army from the Wild Field

Shcherbatov's corps burst into the fortress, after the Russian troops captured the fortress gates

5

Bakhmutsky (Bahmuchesky) hussar

Major General Romanus

843

Berg's corps

blocking the Tatars from the Crimea, at a considerable distance from the main army

 

6

Lugansky pikinerny

Major General Romanus

641

Berg's corps

blocking the Tatars from the Crimea, at a considerable distance from the main army

 

7

Donetsky pikinerny

Major General Romanus

1476

Berg's corps

blocking the Tatars from the Crimea, at a considerable distance from the main army

 

8

Dnieper pikinerny

Major General Shcherbatov, Major General Prozorovsky

1052

2 squadrons from Major General Shcherbatov, 1 squadron from Major General Prozorovsky

2 squadrons - the main forces on the Borisov Heights to block the fortress from the west, 1 squadron to protect the army from the side of the Wild Field

Shcherbatov's squadrons broke into the fortress after the Russian troops captured the fortress gates

9

Elizavetgradsky pikinerny

Major General Zorich

1114

main forces

in the line of regiments on the Borisov Heights to block the fortress from the west, distributed along the entire line

burst into the fortress  after the Russian troops captured the fortress gates

10

Kolchakov's Don Cossack Army Regiment

distributed by corps and brigades

518

distributed by corps and brigades

varied

guarding the camp at heights, reserve for the attackers, blocking the forstadt. Destruction of the Turks who escaped from the fortress

11

Gorbikov’s Don Cossack Army Regiment

distributed by corps and brigades

497

distributed by corps and brigades

varied

guarding the camp at heights, reserve for the attackers, blocking the forstadt. Destruction of the Turks who escaped from the fortress

12

Ataman Grekov’s Don Cossack Army Regiment

distributed by corps and brigades

3207

distributed by corps and brigades

varied

guarding the camp at heights, reserve for the attackers, blocking the forstadt. Destruction of the Turks who escaped from the fortress

13

Little Russian Mirgorodsky

Major General Zorich and Major General Musin-Pushkin

716

distributed among corps and brigades, generally the main forces

varied

burst into the fortress after the Russian troops captured the fortress gates

14

Little Russian Galitsky (Gadyatsky), (Gadyachsky)

Major General Zorich and Major General Musin-Pushkin

1153

distributed among corps and brigades, generally the main forces

varied

burst into the fortress after the Russian troops captured the fortress gates

15

Little Russian Starodubovsky

Major General Zorich and Major General Musin-Pushkin

829

distributed among corps and brigades, generally the main forces

varied

burst into the fortress after the Russian troops captured the fortress gates

16

Little Russian Chernigovsky

Major General Zorich and Major General Musin-Pushkin

965

distributed among corps and brigades, generally the main forces

varied

burst into the fortress after the Russian troops captured the fortress gates

17

Little Russian Lubenskoy

Major General Zorich and Major General Musin-Pushkin

1023

distributed among corps and brigades, generally the main forces

varied

burst into the fortress after the Russian troops captured the fortress gates

18

Little Russian Nezhinsky

Major General Zorich and Major General Musin-Pushkin

1981

distributed among corps and brigades, generally the main forces

varied

burst into the fortress after the Russian troops captured the fortress gates

19

Little Russian Companion

Major General Zorich and Major General Musin-Pushkin

471

distributed among corps and brigades, generally the main forces

varied

burst into the fortress after the Russian troops captured the fortress gates

20

Horse Kalmyks

Major General Prozorovsky

5000

Prozorovsky's corps

actions against Tatars in the Hajibey region

 

 

 

Total of irregular troops

25002

 

 

 

 

 

Total of army

58388

 

 

 

 

 

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